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ABSTRACT
The intra-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) crisis started in late 
May 2017 with the blockade implemented by Saudi Arabia, the 
United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Egypt against Qatar, due to 
its alleged support for terrorist organisations and its meddling 
in their internal affairs. The narrow relationship between Qatar 
and Iran was one of the main factors mentioned by blockading 
states as threatening the stability and unity of the GCC, thus 
leading to the severance of bilateral relations with Doha. While 
the Qatar–Iran relationship was mainly grounded in trade, 
Iran has improved its image in Qatar due to the support Tehran 
provided during this critical period. The gains for Iran may be 
short-lived however, due to the nature of threat perceptions 
in the region that make it increasingly unlikely for Iran to be 
recognised as a normalised state in the Gulf.
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Introduction
The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) crisis that started in late May 2017 has reached 
a stalemate, after several mediation attempts by the United States and Kuwait 
failed to break the deadlock between Qatar and its Arab neighbours. The two GCC 
summits held since the crisis started, in Kuwait in December 2017 and Riyadh in 
December 2018, also ended in failure.1 Moreover, events surrounding the last Asian 
Football Cup held in January–February 2019 in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) 
demonstrated how continued divisions between GCC governments have today 
seeped deeper into the rest of society. News coverage of the events and the way the 
public behaved during the Qatar–Saudi Arabia and Qatar–UAE matches, as well 
as the Cup final between Qatar and Japan, demonstrated that the rift would take 
longer than expected to heal, and may even not be resolved at all.2
Against this backdrop of a prolonged intra-GCC confrontation, new dynamics 
were established among regional actors, who were forced to adapt both discourses 
and actions in order to ensure gains and minimise loses in the delicate strategic 
balance that resulted from the Arab Spring uprisings which were the main trigger 
for the Gulf crisis of 2017.
1 While Qatar’s Emir Tamim Al-Thani attended the Kuwait summit, neither the rulers or heirs of 
Saudi Arabia and UAE did so. In Riyadh, Qatar refrained from participating.
2 Some Saudi and Emirati newspapers did not even mention Qatar in the news titles. See, for 
instance, “Japan lose Asian Cup final” (in Arabic), in Al Bayan, 1 February 2019, https://www.albayan.
ae/sports/asia-cup/2019-02-01-1.3476241; Ashwani Kumar, “Unlucky Japan Lose AFC Asian Cup 
Final”, in Khaleej Times, 2 February 2019, https://www.khaleejtimes.com/unlucky-japan-lose-afc-
asian-cup-final-. Moreover, hundreds of tweets and videos that circulated via WhatsApp showed 
the misbehaviour of the local public throwing objects towards the Qatari players, as well as Omani 
attendants celebrating the Qatari victory despite Emirati opposition, with some Qatari flags 
confiscated violently by the police.
* Luciano Zaccara is Research Assistant Professor in Gulf Politics at the Qatar University Gulf 
Studies Center. The author would like to thank Wafa Sultana Mohiddin, Graduate Assistant at Qatar 
University, for her valuable help in collecting data for this analysis.
. Paper produced in the framework of the IAI-FEPS project entitled “Europe and Iran in a fast-changing 
Middle East: Confidence-building measures, security dialogue and regional cooperation”, May 2019. 
Copyright © 2019 Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) and Foundation for European Progressive Studies 
(FEPS).
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Although not a main actor in the intra-GCC dispute, Iran was among the key 
justifications in the initial Saudi accusation against Qatar, and it had – and still 
has – an essential role as one of the main supporters of Qatar in overcoming the 
blockade. Due to the broader yet overlapping regional confrontation between Iran 
and Saudi Arabia, and the fact that Iranian influence is perceived as a threat by 
certain regional state actors, the Iranian stance regarding the GCC crisis has been 
closely scrutinised. This paper analyses Iran’s policies vis-à-vis Qatar and Arab 
Gulf states, addressing the mixture of gains, losses, opportunities and risks for Iran 
in the context of the ongoing intra-GCC crisis.
1. The Iranian scapegoat for the current GCC crisis
One of the main arguments advanced by this analysis is that Iran was an 
instrumental factor in building the accusation of the four blockade countries 
– Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain and Egypt – against Qatar in May 2017. The 
diplomatic rift was directly related to the comments allegedly made by Qatar’s 
Emir Tamim Al-Thani at a Police Academy graduation ceremony. As subsequently 
posted on the Qatar News Agency (QNA) website, in one of these statements Al-
Thani allegedly referred to Iran as “a big power in the stabilisation of the region” 
while criticising renewed tensions with Tehran.3
The Qatari government denied the authenticity of the comments, claiming that 
the QNA website had been hacked, presumably by the Emirates. US intelligence 
officials later confirmed these hacking allegations.4 Scholars such as Marc Owen 
Jones have also extensively documented the massive virtual campaign conducted 
using tweeter bots and trolls that spread thousands of fake news reports, surveys 
and tweets against Qatar beginning in May 2017.5 Among those, a report reposted 
by the news sites of blockading states alleged the presence of Iranian revolutionary 
guards in Qatar to protect the emir’s palace.6 This, according to them, proved that 
Qatar had abandoned the common Arab Gulf front against Iran and therefore 
deserved to be denounced and punished.
3 “Qatar Says State News Agency Hacked After Report Cites Emir Criticising US”, in BBC News, 24 
May 2017, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-40026822; Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, 
“What’s Going On with Qatar?”, in Monkey Cage, 1 June 2017, https://wapo.st/2rbWjfD.
4 Karen DeYoung and Ellen Nakashima, “UAE Orchestrated Hacking of Qatari Government Sites, 
Sparking Regional Upheaval, According to U.S. Intelligence Officials”, in The Washington Post, 16 
July 2017, http://wapo.st/2tvcnXx.
5 Marc Owen Jones, “Propaganda, Fake News, and Fake Trends: The Weaponization of Twitter Bots 
in the Gulf Crisis”, in International Journal of Communication, Vol. 13 (2019), p. 1389-1415, https://
ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/view/8994/2604.
6 Mohamed Abdel Maguid, “Sheikh Tamim Seeks Protection from IRGC, Deepening Gulf Rift”, in 
Egypt Today, 24 July 2017, http://www.egypttoday.com/Article/2/13376/Sheikh-Tamim-seeks-
protection-from-IRGC-deepening-Gulf-rift.
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Following the initial withdrawal of the Arab quartet’s7 ambassadors from Doha and 
the support coming from US President Donald Trump via Twitter in May 2017, a first 
list of 13 demands was released by the blockading countries on 23 June. The first 
of these directly addressed Iran by requesting that Qatar “scale down diplomatic 
ties with Iran and close the Iranian diplomatic missions in Qatar, expel members 
of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard and cut off military and intelligence cooperation 
with Iran. Trade and commerce with Iran must comply with US and international 
sanctions in a manner that does not jeopardise the security of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council”.8
The other demands included a serious accusation against Qatar regarding its 
alleged ties with “terrorist, sectarian and ideological organizations, specifically the 
Muslim Brotherhood, ISIL, al-Qaeda, [Nusra Front] and Lebanon’s Hezbollah”, and 
Qatar’s meddling in the internal affairs of Arab states by supporting the activities 
of these groups while providing leaders and ideologues safe haven in Qatar. In 
addition, one of the demands specifically took aim at Qatar’s famous news channel 
Al Jazeera, which the blockading countries demanded to be closed. Taken together, 
these demands represented, according to the Arab quartet, the justifications for 
the decision to blockade Qatar.
While the specific demand regarding Iran disappeared in the following “six 
principles” list released on 19 July by the quartet,9 the scapegoat role played by Iran 
is undeniable. This request clearly evidenced the coincidence of positions between 
Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain and the United States regarding Iran, something 
that was later also confirmed in the Warsaw conference, convened by US Secretary 
of State Mike Pompeo and hosted by the Polish government in February 2019.10 
Attended by representatives of 70 states but without the presence of Iran, Turkey, 
Russia, China and Qatar, and with a merely symbolic European representation, 
the summit called for a common front to isolate Iran and prevent its perceived 
destabilising activities in the Middle East. The tweet posted by Israeli Prime 
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, claiming that the gathering was a fundamental step 
to advance “the common interest of war with Iran” – then subsequently changed 
to “combating Iran” – again demonstrated how Iran is the main target of these 
states.11
7 The “blockading quartet” become the usual way for local and international media to refer to Saudi 
Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Egypt, the four countries that decided to cut relations 
with Qatar and block the country’s communications by air, land and sea.
8 See the list of 13 demands at: “Arab States Issue 13 Demands to End Qatar-Gulf Crisis”, in Al Jazeera, 
12 July 2017, http://aje.io/mwal. See also “The 13 Demands on Qatar from Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the 
UAE and Egypt”, in The National, 23 June 2017, https://www.thenational.ae/1.93329.
9 See the six principles list at: Taimur Khan, “Arab Countries’ Six Principles for Qatar ‘A Measure to 
Restart the Negotiation Process”, in The National, 19 July 2017, https://www.thenational.ae/1.610314.
10 See, for instance, Alex Ward, “The US Held a Global Summit to Isolate Iran. America Isolated 
Itself Instead”, in Vox, 15 February 2019, https://www.vox.com/world/2019/2/15/18225218; “Warsaw 
Conference: Gulf Ministers Slam Iran in Leaked Video”, in Al Jazeera,15 February 2019, https://aje.
io/hhaex.
11 Eli Lake, “Netanyahu Accidentally Tells the Truth”, in Bloomberg, 14 February 2019, https://www.
5Iran and the Intra-GCC Crisis: Risks and Opportunities
IA
I 
P
A
P
E
R
S
 1
9
 |
 1
1 
- 
M
A
Y
 2
0
19
IS
S
N
 2
6
10
-9
6
0
3
 | 
IS
B
N
 9
78
-8
8
-9
3
6
8
-1
0
3
-2
©
 2
0
19
 I
A
I-
F
E
P
S
The Trump administration had already made its intentions clear with its goal 
of creating a Middle East Strategic Alliance, an initiative originally mentioned 
during President Trump’s first foreign visit, in Riyadh in May 2017, and officially 
launched in July 2018. Known as the “Arab NATO”, the initiative’s declared goal is to 
strengthen the military assets and preparedness of Gulf and Middle East countries 
to counter Iran’s regional policies and missile threat.12 The recent designation of 
the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp as a foreign terrorist organisation by the US 
administration, the first time that an entire military structure of a foreign country 
has been added to that list, only serves to reaffirm the US objective of containing 
Iran, working to minimise Iranian influence in accordance with the avowed policy 
of “maximum pressure” towards that country.13
However, these efforts by the United States seem to neglect the fact that the 
current GCC spat is preventing possible long-term strategic alignments between 
the six GCC members. Indeed, the departure of Qatar from the Organisation of the 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in December 2018 and the new cooperation 
framework, the Saudi-Emirati Coordination Council, created in 2016 and enhanced 
in June 2018 with the signature of 44 new partnership projects including security 
and foreign policy initiatives,14 may even point to a possible dissolution of the GCC 
in the not too distant future.15
2. Iran–Qatar relations
It is fair to say that Qatar–Iran relations were not at their best before the current 
crisis, not least since the two countries tend to support opposing factions in 
regional conflicts. While Qatar maintained that the Iranian-backed Hezbollah 
movement in Lebanon is a terrorist organisation,16 Iran shared the Saudi accusation 
regarding Qatar’s sponsorship of extremist groups in Syria that are fighting against 
bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-02-14/netanyahu-accidentally-tells-the-truth-about-war-
with-iran.
12 Yasmine Farouk, “The Middle East Strategic Alliance Has a Long Way to Go”, in Carnegie Articles, 
February 2019, https://carnegieendowment.org/publications/?fa=78317.
13 White House, Statement from the President on the Designation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard 
Corps as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, 8 April 2019, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-
statements/statement-president-designation-islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps-foreign-terrorist-
organization.
14 Saudi Arabia Ministry of Economy and Planning website: The Saudi-Emirati Coordination 
Council, https://www.mep.gov.sa/en/Pages/KSA_UAE.aspx; and “UAE, Saudi Announce Strategic 
Partnership in 44 Projects”, in Khaleej Times, 7 June 2018, https://www.khaleejtimes.com/region/
saudi-arabia/uae-saudi-announce-strategic-partnership-in-44-projects.
15 Nikolay Kozhanov, “Qatar’s Exit from the OPEC: Economically Driven, Politically Determined”, in 
Gulf Insights, No. 5 (January 2019), http://www.qu.edu.qa/static_file/qu/research/Gulf%20Studies/
documents/gulf%20insights%205%20Nikolay%20Kozhanov.pdf.
16 Hugh Naylor, “In Jab at Iran, Gulf Arab States Declare Hezbollah a Terrorist Group”, in The 
Washington Post, 2 March 2016, http://wapo.st/1VQc2XY.
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the Iranian-backed Assad regime, for instance the Nusra Front.17 During several 
informal conversations held in Tehran in 2017, Qatar was always mentioned as a 
country whose regional policy was perceived as hostile towards Iranian interests.
Qatar’s traditional deference towards Saudi Arabia – for instance in participating 
in the Saudi-led coalition in the Yemen war, or reducing diplomatic relations 
with Iran in 2016 after the Saudi embassy storming in Tehran – are generally 
highlighted as examples in Tehran. However, when the GCC crisis erupted after the 
May 2017 Riyadh Summit with Donald Trump, Iran quickly decided to prioritise its 
confrontation with Saudi Arabia, moving to support Qatar in the intra-GCC dispute 
in order to weaken Riyadh and enhance Tehran’s regional leverage.
In this context, following the blockade, there were several direct communications 
between Iranian and Qatari officials, which not only made Iranian support explicit 
but also enhanced bilateral relations. On 23 August 2017, Qatar announced that 
its ambassador would be sent back to Tehran with the “aspiration to strengthen 
bilateral relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran in all fields”.18 This took place 
soon after a phone call between the two foreign ministers, Qatar’s Mohammed bin 
Abdulrahman Al-Thani and Iran’s Mohammad Javad Zarif. During the conversation, 
they discussed “bilateral relations and means of boosting and developing them as 
well as a number of issues of common concern”.19
By the end of August, President Hassan Rouhani had held a phone conversation 
with the Emir of Qatar, expressing Iran’s willingness to strengthen relations and 
affirming that “the Islamic Republic of Iran believes that what is being imposed on 
Qatar is unjust and it leads to more tension among countries of the region”.20
The Iranian government’s support for Qatar went beyond political statements, 
however. Since the very beginning of the crisis, Iran clearly showed staunch 
support and expressed its willingness to prevent the blockade on Qatar, its economy 
and population. Tehran was very swift in setting up new time slots to expedite the 
use of Iranian airspace by Qatar Airways, which was hit hard by an airspace ban by 
blockading countries and therefore compelled to explore new routes.21 Apart from 
this, Iran sent planes carrying food to Qatar, helping the import-reliant Gulf state 
17 “Qatar ‘Maybe’ Supported Al-Qaeda in Syria, Says Former PM”, in Middle East Eye, 30 October 2017, 
https://www.middleeasteye.net/node/66993.
18 Qatar’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Qatar Announces Return of Its Ambassador to Tehran, 23 
August 2017, https://www.mofa.gov.qa/en/all-mofa-news/details/2017/08/23/qatar-announces-
return-of-its-ambassador-to-tehran.
19 “Qatar to Reinstate Ambassador to Iran”, in The Peninsula, 24 August 2017, https://www.
thepeninsulaqatar.com/article/24/08/2017/Qatar-to-reinstate-ambassador-to-Iran.
20 Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tehran Ready to Cement Ties with Qatar/Iran Willing to Help 
Muslim Countries of Region Deepen Relations, 31 August 2017, http://air.ir/Zsq2Szp.
21 According to one Hamad International Airport technician consulted, the normal time allocated 
between aircrafts to cross the Iranian airspace was three minutes, which the Iranian authorities 
reduced to two minutes to accommodate Qatar’s needs.
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to deal with the air, sea and land blockade imposed by its neighbours.
Although economic diversification away from the oil and gas sector has always 
been part of its national strategy, Qatar sensed the key importance of non-
hydrocarbon trade in light of the blockade. Hence, there was a surge in non-oil 
trade with Iran, and Iranian businesses began to tap into growing opportunities in 
Qatar, which sought new trading partners to replace links with Saudi Arabia and 
the UAE. Iranian producers and business delegations have visited Doha since June 
2017 with an aim to establish permanent links with the Qatari market.
In November 2017, Qatar’s Economy Minister Ahmad bin Jassim Al-Thani travelled 
to the Iranian capital for talks with government ministers on business links between 
the two countries, including the Minister of Industry, Mines and Trade, Mohammad 
Shariatmadari, and Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif. Following the talks, 
Shariatmadari said trade between the two countries was currently worth around 1 
billion US dollars per year, but noted that Qatar wanted to boost this five-fold to 5 
billion US dollars annually.22
It is not clear how this may be achieved, but economic activity has grown sharply 
this year and there is certainly more potential. Data from the Iran Customs 
Administration show that Iran exported 139 million US dollar worth of non-oil 
goods to Qatar in the seven months from April to late October – a timeframe that 
covers both pre- and post-boycott periods. This was equivalent to a 117.5 per cent 
increase over the previous year.23
Major Iranian shipping companies have started transport services to Qatar and 
most Iranian shipping lines have changed their services, moving from Dubai and 
Muscat to Doha in an effort to meet the new needs of the Qatari market.24 Iran’s 
biggest confectionery company, the Shirin Asal Food Industrial Group, with a 
turnover of 5 billion US dollars per year, decided to enter the Qatari retail market 
and aims for a long-term supply contract to meet the growing Qatari demand for 
Iranian goods.25
The main export goods were food, agricultural products and bitumen. In addition 
to this, Iran, Turkey and Qatar signed a transportation agreement to boost trade 
among the three countries. As per the deal, goods from Turkey and Azerbaijan can 
be transported by land through Iran, reducing costs by about 80 per cent compared 
22 “Iran FM, Qatari Minister Call for Promotion of Business Ties”, in Iran Front Page, 26 November 
2017, https://ifpnews.com/?p=87554.
23 Dominic Dudley, “How Qatar Is Being Pushed into the Arms of Iran by Saudi Arabia and Its 
Allies”, in Forbes, 27 November 2017, https://www.forbes.com/sites/dominicdudley/2017/11/27/qatar-
pushed-into-arms-of-iran-by-saudi.
24 “Iran, Turkey, Qatar Sign Deal to Ease Doha Blockade”, in Financial Tribune, 27 November 2017, 
https://financialtribune.com/node/76877.
25 “Iran Confectionery Giant Makes Inroads Into Qatar Market”, in Financial Tribune, 29 October 
2017, https://financialtribune.com/node/75193.
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to airfreight charges.26 There has also been a gain for Iran from the rerouting 
of Qatar Airways flights, which are no longer able to fly through the airspace of 
Bahrain, Saudi Arabia or the UAE. That means they have to take longer paths to get 
to the Americas and parts of Europe and Africa, and Iran has been happy to offer its 
airspace, gaining substantial overflight fees in the process.
Iran’s role during and after the blockade has also resulted in an improvement of 
popular perceptions of Iran among the Qatari population. A survey conducted by 
Qatar University’s Social and Economic Survey Research Institute (SESRI) between 
April and May 2018 and consisting of 1,502 respondents (733 Qataris and 769 
expatriates), showed how perceptions improved among Qataris, with Iran, Turkey, 
Kuwait and Oman considered Qatar’s biggest supporters during the blockade 
among both nationals and non-nationals in the country.27
Figure 1 below shows yearly import data for Qatar from the UAE, Saudi Arabia and 
Bahrain. The dip in 2017 is quite noticeable and is directly linked to the blockade 
against Qatar. The drop in UAE imports from 2016 to 2017 was about 1.1 billion US 
dollars and the drop in Saudi based imports was about 824 million US dollars.
Figure 1 | Qatar imports from UAE, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, 2011–2018
Source: Estimates obtained from CEIC Insights data.
26 “Turkey, Iran and Qatar Sign New Trade-Transport Agreement”, in Middle East Monitor, 27 
November 2017, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20171127-turkey-iran-and-qatar-sign-new-
trade-transport-agreement.
27 Justin Gengler and Buthaina Al-Khelaifi, Qatar against the Blockade (2nd Wave), report of the 
SESRI 2018 Omnibus Survey, August 2018.
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Figure 2 shows imports from other countries to Qatar. The imports from Oman 
increased significantly from about 357 million US dollars in 2016 to 770 million in 
2017, which is an increase of about 103 per cent. Kuwaiti imports also increased 
from 174 million US dollars in 2016 to 257 million in 2017. Interestingly, imports 
from Iran remained low comparing 2016 to 2017 at about 82 million US dollars. 
Turkey also increased its exports to Qatar by about 20 per cent from about 541 
million US dollars in 2016 to 660 million in 2017.
Figure 2 | Qatar imports from other countries, 2011–2018
Source: United Nations COMTRADE data.
According to a leading Qatari English daily, The Peninsula, Iranian exports to Qatar 
have surged significantly since the crisis began. Iranian exporters have dispatched 
a total of 624,840 tons of goods valued at over 119 billion US dollars to Qatar since 
March 2017, which amounts to an increase of more than 81 per cent compared to 
figures for the same period over the previous year provided by the Iranian Customs 
Administration.28 The chairman of Iran’s Chamber of Commerce also predicted 
that exports to Qatar would rise further to 300 million US dollars in 2018–19 and 
highlighted the growing trade relationship between Iran and Qatar.29
It must be noted that soon after the blockade Qatar reinstated its ambassador to Iran. 
Mohammed bin Hamad Al Hajri became the newly appointed Qatari ambassador, 
moving to restore diplomatic relations with Iran previously cut off by Qatar in 
28 Irfan Bukhari, “Iran’s Exports to Qatar Surge Significantly”, in The Peninsula, 21 November 2017, 
http://www.thepeninsulaqatar.com/article/21/11/2017/Iran’s-exports-to-Qatar-surge-significantly.
29 Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Iranian Exports to Qatar Continue to Rise, 25 January 2019, 
https://country.eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=87579392.
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solidarity with Saudi Arabia when the latter accused Iran of interference in the 
domestic affairs of Gulf and Arab countries. In 2016, Iranian protestors ransacked 
the Saudi Embassy in Tehran after Saudi Arabia executed senior Shia cleric Sheikh 
Nimr al-Nimr along with several others on charges of terrorism and for being an 
outspoken critic of the Saudi regime. This resulted in all Gulf states breaking off 
diplomatic ties with Iran, with Qatar withdrawing its ambassador from Tehran 
following the embassy assault.
3. Are Iranian gains short lived?
The intra-GCC crisis has resulted in a number of positive outcomes for Iran 
especially with regard to its bilateral relations with Turkey and Qatar. However, 
these benefits for Iran will not last long if the intra-Gulf conflict is resolved abruptly, 
or if it further worsens in coincidence with enhanced regional and international 
pressure on Tehran. Despite a surge in trade links that has resulted in Iranian 
exports to Qatar increasing five-fold compared to the previous year, countries 
like China, the US, India, Japan and Germany continue to be Qatar’s key trading 
partners. More than 74 million US dollar worth of goods were shipped from Iran to 
Qatar in the first quarter of the Persian year, up 214 per cent from the same period 
in the previous year, while China, the US and India exported goods worth 272, 265 
and 219 million US dollars respectively.
Though Iranian gains may seem overwhelmingly positive, they are not that 
different from the trade profits made by other countries on which Qatar had to rely 
in the wake of the blockade. Thus, this circumstantial reliance on Iran could be cut 
short should the crisis be resolved and the blockade lifted, although this option 
remains so far unlikely due to the lack of improvement exhibited in December 
2018 GCC summit and April 2019 Arab League summit, in which no direct contact 
was established between the rulers involved in the spat.30
The Qatari and Iranian governments have been very proactive in promoting 
bilateral visits of businessmen. Yet, efforts to establish an Iranian–Qatari Chamber 
of Commerce have been successful in Iran, but have thus far not materialised in 
Qatar.31 Moreover, while it is true that since June 2017 Iranian goods – mainly 
fruits, vegetables, dairy products, dry fruit and other food items – have become 
more visible in Qatari supermarket chains, it is also true that these products need 
to travel relatively small distances compared to other non-oil products such as 
construction items, which are coming from Turkey and Azerbaijan. In other 
30 The December 2018 GCC Summit in Riyadh was not attended by the emir of Qatar. Previously, the 
rulers of Saudi Arabia and the UAE had refrained from attending the December 2017 Kuwait Summit. 
Finally, the April Arab League summit in Tunisia witnessed the sudden departure of Tamim Al-Thani 
during the inaugural speech. These absences prevented any potential contact among the leaders of 
the blockading states and Qatar.
31 Interviews conducted in Iran and Qatar in January 2019 with Iranian businessmen and members 
of the Iranian Chamber of Commerce.
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words, perishable products are more likely to come from Iran because of the short 
distance and reduced price compared with other origins.
Businessmen interviewed in Iran expressed that several Qatari delegations visited 
different factories in several locations. The aim was to demonstrate Iranian 
readiness to adapt production lines according to Qatari requirements, producing 
goods for its market. However, so far no agreements have been reached. While 
Iranian producers seem to look for Qatari investments in their factories, their 
Qatari counterparts are more interested in establishing factories inside Qatar, 
meaning that the main investment effort should originate from the Iranian side. 
This request seems logical, since Qatar’s previous dependence on external food 
production, mainly from Saudi Arabia and the Emirates, should not be replaced by 
a dependence on Iran, a country still considered a threat in the GCC context.
Thus, long-term expectations of consistent and permanent trade agreements 
between Iran and Qatar are not likely to be fulfilled. Moreover, and even though 
Saudi–Qatari relations are currently in a deep freeze, interviewed Qatari officials at 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs argue that the situation will not persist indefinitely. 
An eventual reconciliation with Saudi Arabia would necessarily affect any long-
term agreement with Iran, and surely Qatar does not want to give the Saudi 
government justification for its concerns regarding Doha’s close relations with 
Iran.
The fact that it is difficult to find concrete data or information regarding the actual 
amount of bilateral trade between Iran and Qatar, and that few people are willing to 
be quoted on the record on these matters, is also a demonstration of how sensitive 
the topic is for all actors involved.
Bilateral agreements, therefore, seem to be a necessary but circumstantial 
mechanism to guarantee the provision of goods to Qatar, from Iran and elsewhere. 
The main aim is to diversify providers, making Iran the main delivery route to 
Doha. Data from the Ministries of Trade have not yet been published, and nor have 
data from international organisations such as the World Trade Organisation or the 
World Bank. However, one can presume that trade between Qatar and Turkey has 
increased in absolute terms much more than Qatari–Iranian exchanges; and that, 
in any case, trade volumes with Iran are likely to reach similar levels as Qatar had 
with Saudi or the UAE before the blockade started in June 2017.
4. The Iranian role in the region and future prospects
Iran has long competed for power and influence in the Persian Gulf region. This 
competition is intertwined with territorial conflicts and cultural differences, and, 
after the Islamic Revolution in 1979, an ideological component. As a matter of 
fact, a common aspect derived from the analysis of Iranian foreign policy well 
before 1979 reveals an aspiration to become a key player not only in the Persian 
12
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Gulf but also the wider Middle East and Central Asia. Under Shah Mohammad 
Reza Pahlavi (1941–1979) Iran deployed several foreign policy initiatives, such as 
the “independent national policy” that used hard-power tools, including direct 
military involvement in regional scenarios, to exert the role of regional power and 
gendarme of the Gulf.32
Yet, beyond a given states’ aspirations, capabilities and achievements, a decisive 
factor for the categorisation of a state as a regional power is its acceptance by 
others within this regional system or sub-system as well as those extra-regional 
actors, or global powers, who continue to determine the rules of the game within 
the region and at the broader international level as well.33
In the Iranian case, such an acceptance was invisible until the Joint Comprehensive 
Plan of Action (JCPOA), the Iran nuclear deal, was signed in 2015. Prior to this, Iran 
was excluded from all regional dialogue frameworks relating to security issues, an 
aspect that prevented Iran from normalising its relations with Persian Gulf states 
or key international actors.
However, under reformist President Hassan Rouhani, Iranian foreign policy 
towards GCC states changed in orientation. With several diplomatic initiatives 
aimed at improving relations – especially with smaller states, like Qatar, Kuwait 
and Oman – Iran sought to gain trust in its foreign policy. As luck would have it, the 
2017 intra-GCC crisis provided Iran an opening to depict Saudi Arabia as the real 
threat to regional stability and sovereignty, using the crisis to expand its influence 
in Qatar and Lebanon for example. In other words, the crisis provided Iran the 
opportunity to demonstrate that Tehran is not the “bad guy in the neighbourhood”, 
pointing to Saudi Arabia instead.
Despite Iranian concerns regarding Qatari support to groups opposed to Iranian 
interests, Iran sided with Qatar, using a very pragmatic approach that prioritised 
long-term confrontation with Saudi Arabia. Iran showed its readiness to help in 
any way possible, and swiftly expressed its strong support to the Qatari emir, as 
well as mobilising all productive forces to guarantee the provision of fresh goods 
in the first weeks of the blockade.
The crisis has also helped Iran move away from the traditional sectarian dichotomy 
since Tehran has strengthened its relations with Sunni states such as Qatar and 
Turkey despite their rivalries in Syria and other regional issues. On the other 
hand, Qatar maintained a very different approach towards Iran compared to Saudi 
32 Luciano Zaccara, “Iran’s Permanent Quest for Regional Power Status”, in Jacqueline Braveboy-
Wagner (ed.), Diplomatic Strategies of Nations in the Global South. The Search for Leadership, New 
York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2016, p. 181-211.
33 Detlef Nolte, “How to Compare Regional Powers: Analytical Concepts and Research Topics”, in 
Review of International Studies, Vol. 36, No. 4 (October 2010), p. 881-901, https://www.giga-hamburg.
de/sites/default/files/publications/how_to_compare.pdf.
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Arabia not only because they share the biggest gas field in the world34 but also due 
to the fact that Qatari authorities do not share with Saudi Arabia the same threat 
perceptions about Iran.
Again, pragmatism seems to be the main driver of the current bilateral relations 
between Doha and Tehran. One of the facts that shows this is an interview with the 
former Qatari Prime Minister Hamad bin Jassim Al-Thani on France24, where he 
urged the Trump administration to resolve its differences with Tehran in a peaceful 
way, and also stressed that the GCC needed to engage in a serious dialogue with 
Iran.35
The fact that Qatar hosts the Al Udeid airbase, the regional headquarters for the 
US Central Command (CENTCOM) with almost seven thousand soldiers, puts 
both states in a very sensitive situation, bearing in mind Qatar’s cordial relations 
with Iran and the accusations that President Trump levied against Qatar at the 
beginning of the crisis in late May 2017. Also sensitive is the fact that the recently 
re-imposed US sanctions against Iran, and the third round expected in May 2019, 
will definitively have an impact on Qatar–Iranian relations.
It is undeniable that US–Qatar relations are essential for the survival of the Emirate 
at a military level, and the Qatari government would not risk losing US support 
because of its lack of compliance with US sanctions. On the other hand, Iran now 
represents the only air and sea exit and entry to Qatar, and its government is not 
willing to risk the withdrawal of Iranian support while the Saudi-led blockade 
continues.
Conclusion
Iran has been used as a scapegoat for the intra-GCC crisis, since the Islamic Republic 
is portrayed as a threat by Saudi Arabia as well as by the US Trump administration 
and Israel. The instrumentalisation of the Iranian threat has been useful since 1981 
and has become a source of several policies aimed at containing Iranian regional 
influence since the signature of the JCPOA and the Trump administration’s 
disavowal of the deal, including the abovementioned Middle East Initiative, the 
Warsaw Summit or the recent designation of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps 
(Sepah-e Pasdaran) as a terrorist organisation. However, the current crisis can be 
interpreted as a side effect of the Arab Spring, as a result of the different approaches 
34 The South Pars–North Dome gas field is divided between the territorial waters of Iran (3,700 km2) 
and Qatar (6,000 km2). According to the 2018 International Energy Agency (IEA) report, the field 
holds an estimated 51 trillion cubic meters of natural gas and some 50 billion barrels of natural gas 
condensates, totalling almost as much recoverable reserves as all the other fields combined. See IEA, 
World Energy Outlook 2008, Paris, IEA, November 2008, p. 298, https://www.iea.org/publications/
freepublications/publication/weo-2008.html.
35 Marc Perelman, “Saudi Crown Prince ‘Not Well Advised’, Former Qatari PM Tells France 24”, in 
France24, 17 September 2018, http://f24.my/3crB.T.
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the GCC states used to tackle the effect of the revolts in their own countries, and 
the conflicting identification of threat perceptions for regime survival that resulted 
from the spread of popular unrest. Iran has been clearly identified as one of the 
main threats by Saudi Arabia, due to the perceived negative role Iran played in 
regional scenarios such as Yemen, Syria and Bahrain. Thus, Tehran’s relations with 
Qatar became part of the problem as seen from Riyadh or Abu Dhabi.
Iranian gains during the crisis have been visible in terms of strengthening bilateral 
relations as well as trade exchanges with Qatar. However, these may be short-lived, 
since dynamics affecting international relations in the Gulf prevent Iran from 
being recognised and accepted as a normal state with regional power aspirations. 
Without this formal recognition, any long-term agreement that can include foreign 
investments, joint ventures or strategic partnerships between Qatar and Iran are 
highly unlikely. In the eventual, although so far unlikely, scenario of Saudi–Qatari 
reconciliation, it is very likely that the relation with Iran would sacrificed for the 
sake of intra-GCC stability and unity. In this respect, refraining from signing long-
term commitments with Tehran will likely make it less problematic for Doha to 
eventually re-entre the GCC fold.
On the other hand, regional actors with similar aspirations of being regional 
powers in a zero sum game, such as Saudi Arabia or Israel, will not share their 
power with a state which is perceived as the main security threat for their own state 
and regime. Moreover, with the change in Washington’s orientation since Donald 
Trump assumed office, the pressure is now concentrated towards containing Iran, 
rather than achieving a regional settlement or dialogue that can accommodate the 
concerns and interests of all actors.
To sum up, Iran has emerged as a temporary winner in the ongoing cold war 
with Saudi Arabia since the intra-GCC crisis began. Although the siege countries 
calculated that Qatar would be forced to cut off diplomatic ties with Iran as an 
outcome of the blockade, the state of affairs has turned these initial hopes on their 
head. Iran’s efforts have led it to improve relations with both Qatar and Turkey, with 
Tehran entering into long-term agreements on various bilateral and multilateral 
issues with both states.
Nevertheless, acknowledging Iran as a regional power has little consensus among 
many countries, including Qatar. While Saudi Arabia’s mission is to curb Iranian 
domination in the Persian Gulf and across the region, US President Donald 
Trump is intent on doubling down on his country’s policy of “maximum pressure” 
towards Iran, withdrawing from the Iran nuclear deal, re-imposing sanctions on 
Iran and ratcheting up regional and international pressure on Tehran. Thus, as the 
intra-GCC crisis continues, so do anti-Iranian sentiments across the Gulf, further 
weakening Iran’s claim to regional leadership and legitimacy in the Persian Gulf 
and broader region.
Updated 12 May 2018
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